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Abstract—Generative Policy-based Models (GPMs) aim to
enable a coalition of systems—be they devices or services—to
adapt according to contextual changes such as environmental
factors, user preferences and different tasks whilst adhering to
various constraints and regulations as directed by a managing
party or the collective vision of the coalition. Recent develop-
ments have proposed new architectures to realize the potential
of GPMs but as the complexity of systems and their associated
requirements increases, there is an emerging requirement to have
scenarios and associated datasets to realistically evaluate GPMs
with respect to the properties of the operating environment—
be it the future battlespace or an autonomous organization. In
order to address this requirement, in this paper, we present a
method of applying an agile knowledge representation framework
to model requirements—both individualistic and collective—
that enables synthetic generation of ground truth data such
that advanced GPMs can be evaluated robustly in complex
environments. We also release conceptual models, annotated
datasets, as well as means to extend the data generation approach
so that similar datasets can be developed for varying complexities
and different situations.
Index Terms—Coalition, Dataset Generation, Data Semantics,
Policies, Generative Policy-based Models
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the International Technology Alliance for Distributed
Analytics and Information Sciences (DAIS-ITA)1, fundamen-
tal research is being performed to realise the future bat-
tlespace envisioned by various military Doctrine papers [1, 2].
The DAIS-ITA programme focuses on two technical areas;
(1) Dynamic Secure Coalition Information Infrastructures and
(2) Coalition Distributed Analytics and Situational Under-
standing. In the future battlespace, coalition systems and
devices will be required to operate in challenging environ-
ments that impose certain constraints such as lack of or low
bandwidth connectivity to backend services, rapidly changing
environmental conditions and the requirement to abide by
legal regulations and mission directives. Therefore, coalition
systems and devices require the capability to adapt and evolve
such that they can behave autonomously ‘at the edge’ in previ-
ously unseen contexts. Crucially, systems need to understand
the bounds in which they can operate based on their own (and
that of other systems) capability, constraints of the environ-
ment and safety requirements. Also, systems and devices with
1https://dais-ita.org/
varying autonomous capability may be required to collaborate
with humans and other coalition partners to achieve a shared
coalition goal, thus outlining the requirement for explainable
actions and decisions. Recent work within the DAIS-ITA
programme has developed the notion of Generative Policy-
based Models (GPMs) for use in coalition environments [3]
to enable coalition systems to define their behaviour and adapt
to new situations whilst conforming to a variety of constraints
and regulations.
In order to evaluate our work and demonstrate it’s appli-
cability to coalition environments, illustrative scenarios and
accompanying datasets are required. In a military scenario,
this is challenging due to the lack of publicly available datasets
and mission-specific information. Current efforts to date utilize
non-military scenarios and datasets, such as open source
traffic cameras for congestion classification [4] and IoT related
deployments for smart-home policy management [5]. Also,
recent work has outlined an approach for generating synthetic
data based on a Connected and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV)
scenario [6, 7] utilising an agile knowledge representation
framework that supports human-machine conversations as well
as reasoning and hypothesis testing.
This paper extends the high level DAIS-ITA scenario [8] and
develops the knowledge representation approach for synthetic
data generation by enabling the user to control the complexity
of the dataset to support future evaluations as the fundamental
research progresses. The paper is structured as follows. In
Section II we discuss a set of illustrative vignettes to moti-
vate our work alongside relevant background knowledge. In
Section III we outline the knowledge representation approach
including DAIS-ITA specific domain models and discuss the
approach for generating data with varying complexity. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section IV by providing closing
remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
This section outlines a set of background knowledge includ-
ing two military focused vignettes that may occur in a coalition
operation, based on the high-level DAIS-ITA scenario [8].
In the proposed vignettes, let us assume three partners are
working together in a coalition, namely the UK, US and a
fictitious Non-Government Organization ‘Kish’ in order to
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achieve a mission objective in a given region. In this section
we also discuss a potential challenge for coalitions surrounding
asset serviceability as a future application for generative policy
research.
A. Person of Interest Tracking
As detailed in [8], one possible mission the coalition could
be tasked with is ‘Person of Interest Tracking’ which involves
the monitoring of a High-Value Target (HVT). A detailed
breakdown of the various phases of activity within this mission
is shown in Figure 1 including potential adversary actions and
resource constraints.
Fig. 1: Person of Interest Tracking Mission, obtained from [8]
In this scenario, different coalition partners will have dif-
ferent roles and responsibilities. For example, UK forces
could partner with Kish’s local security force to execute the
‘Plan’ and ‘Find’ stages and the US may partner with the
UK and Kish for the ‘Track’, ‘Assess’ and ‘Exploit’ stages.
The planning stage involves identifying a set of coalition
assets and resources to use which may be constrained by
power and connectivity, as well as being vulnerable to man-
in-the-middle attacks from an adversary intercepting network
communications. Then, the coalition finds and tracks the
person of interest, and finally collates the results. Throughout
the mission, coalition assets are subject to re-tasking, e.g. if the
enemy plants an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), coalition
forces and assets may have to relocate to deal with the IED.
Also, the coalition has to manage data storage, power and
network connectivity constraints dynamically throughout the
mission.
B. Logistical Resupply
The second vignette describes a logistical resupply mission
to serve coalition troops that are stationed in a given location
such as a city. A convoy is provided by a civilian contractor
and is accompanied by a guarding force, or force protection
element, from another coalition partner. In addition, regular
resupply of troops in the city is conducted by autonomous
resupply drones, that also have other tasks such as resupply of
high priority special forces elements in mountainous locations
outside the city. Similarly to the first vignette, this vignette
is broken down into phases of activity as shown in Figure 2.
These take into account elements such as the planning phase
where intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets will
have to be assigned to the mission; monitoring of the mission
during its execution; and the recovery phase back to base. The
enemy will once again be employing disruption tactics and the
coalition is constrained by the resources available for use.
Fig. 2: Logistical Resupply Mission, obtained from [8]
C. Military Environments
As detailed in [8], the missions outlined above could po-
tentially be executed in a wide range of environments, which
impose various constraints on the types of activities that can
occur for a given mission. This is detailed in Table I.
Urban Desert Jungle Mountain
Number of
non-combatants
High Low Low Low
Amount of valuable
infrastructure
High Low Low Low
Presence of
multi-dimensional
battlespace
Yes No Some Yes
Restricted rules of
engagement
Yes No Some Yes
Detection,
observation,
engagement ranges
Short Long Short Medium
Avenues of
approach
Many Many Few Few
Freedom of
movement &
manoeuvre
Low High Low Medium
Communications
Functionality
Less Normal Normal Less
Logistical
Requirements
High High Medium Medium
TABLE I: Possible Mission Environments, obtained from [8]
D. ALFUS Framework: Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Sys-
tems
Huang has outlined varying levels of autonomy, ranging
from 0–10 inclusive that describe the full range of autonomous
capability in unmanned systems [9]. Figure 3 details Mission
Complexity (MC), Environmental Complexity (EC) and Hu-
man Interaction (HI) capabilities at each level. The overall
ALFUS level is obtained through scoring each capability with
a value 0–3 inclusive, for levels 1–9. At level 0, each capability
receives a 0 score to indicate no autonomous capability and
level 10 remains independent to represent the ultimate goal
for autonomy.
Fig. 3: Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS),
obtained from [9]
E. Asset Serviceability
In order to perform the two missions outlined in Figures 1
and 2, coalition partners are required to work together which
may involve sharing assets with one another. An asset could
be a physical device such as a surveillance camera, an
autonomous system such as an unmanned aerial vehicle or
an asset could be a virtual service such as a database or
a specific type of machine learning model such as a face
recognizer or weaponry detector. Each asset has a set of time-
bound constraints that govern its use at a given point in time.
Possible constraint types are defined as follows: (1) Physical
Constraints—the asset can only operate in certain physical
locations or contexts. Also, in order to utilize an asset the re-
questor may need to be within a suitable physical range of the
asset; (2) Security Constraints—certain functionality within
the asset may be withheld by the asset owner through access
control. For example, the high value targets database may only
accept read requests from a requestor iff they are requesting
information about a given target. (3) Trust Constraints—
certain assets or functionality may only be shared between
coalition partners iff the trust value between partners is above
a predefined threshold. In the above definitions, constraints can
be local to the individual asset in a given context (e.g. a certain
autonomous vehicle is currently unable to drive autonomously
given high wind speeds) or constraints can be applied at the
global level by the coalition partner (e.g. do not share the facial
recognition model unless the trust with the requesting partner
is greater than or equal to a predefined threshold). Given
the constantly evolving context and potentially dynamic asset
pool caused by coalition partners frequently bringing assets
online/offline during a mission, local and global serviceability
policies that define the type of requests that an asset or
coalition partner can service will be constantly in flux and
it wont be possible for a human operator to generate all of
these policies for all assets in all possible contexts in a timely
manner. Also, given the distributed nature of a partners assets,
the coalition partner as a whole requires means to keep track
of the serviceability of its asset pool through a generated
policy and also is responsible for communicating this updated
policy in a distributed manner to its assets. For example, a
US autonomous vehicle, denoted Vehicle A moves to a new
location in the city so that the camera and object detector
on-board the vehicle can now fulfill requests for information
regarding a new type of object (e.g. civilian pedestrians are
now in view). Vehicle A now needs to generate a new local
policy that states that it can service these new requests and
this policy needs to be communicated to all US assets, so that
the US can generate a global policy that states that if any asset
within the US inventory receives a request regarding the street
Vehicle A is located at, the asset can direct the requestor to
Vehicle A, or, utilize the Software Defined Network to perform
the request to Vehicle A on behalf of the requestor.
III. APPROACH
Utilizing the existing knowledge and literature presented in
Section II, as well as the requirement to account for asset
serviceability, in this section we discuss our approach for
representing the coalition environment by creating DAIS-ITA
specific domain models to support synthetic data generation.
A. Knowledge Representation
ITA Controlled English (CE) [10] was chosen as a seman-
tic knowledge base due to it’s expressive power and built-
in reasoning capabilities that enable future human-machine
conversational interfaces to be developed that utilize the con-
ceptual model. Also, CE enables domain models to be easily
specified using human-readable, controlled natural language
conceptualise a ˜ mission ˜ M that
has the value ’S’ as ˜ high level stage ˜ and
has the value ’A’ as ˜ potential adversary action
↪→ ˜ and
has the value ’C’ as ˜ constraint ˜.
conceptualise a ˜ mission instance ˜ MI that
˜ is an instance of ˜ the mission M and
˜ is executed by ˜ the coalition C and
˜ is executed in ˜ the mission environment E and
˜ is executed in ˜ the environmental condition
↪→ instance ECI and
has the value ’T’ as ˜ start time ˜.
Fig. 4: CE concept definitions for a mission and mission
instance
which ensures our work is extendable if necessary. Figure 4
details the concept definitions for a mission and a mission
instance in CE. This is inspired by the illustrative vignettes
outlined in Figures 1 and 2 as missions contain high level
stages, can be disrupted by potential adversary actions and
are bound by certain constraints. Also, inspired by Table I,
missions can be executed in different mission environments
and different environmental conditions, as well as being under-
taken by a certain coalition at a certain date/time. Note that the
coalition, mission environment and environmental condition
instance concepts are defined separately and are not included
in Figure 4 due to space limitations. We release the full concept
definition online for further reference2.
The concept of a mission and a mission instance can then be
instantiated in CE as facts and stored in the knowledge base.
For example, Figure 5 defines the person of interest tracking
mission and instantiates it with respect to a coalition, mis-
sion environment, environmental conditions and a start time.
Domain modelling is repeated for other concepts including
ALFUS levels, coalition partners, coalition trust relationships,
environmental conditions and assets and stored in the knowl-
edge base for instantiation. The full model illustrating concepts
and their relationships is shown in Figure 6.
B. Fact Generation
Facts such as those detailed in Figure 5 can be used
to generate a dataset that is required for evaluating GPMs.
However, in this scenario, there are a large amount of facts
required in the knowledge base in order to represent a real-
world coalition environment and it would be too cumbersome
to generate these facts manually. Therefore, we define a small
set of base concepts and generate facts programmatically as
shown with the generalized approach in Algorithm 1.
Firstly, we define a set of possible environmental conditions:
visibility level, temperature level, rainfall level, snowfall level,
wind speed level and humidity level where each condition con-
tains an associated lower and upper bound, appropriate units
and a weighting to denote the importance of this condition.
This refers to line 1 in Algorithm 1. Environmental condition
2https://github.com/dais-ita/coalition-data
there is a mission named ’person of interest
↪→ tracking’ that
has the value ’plan’ as high level stage and
has the value ’find’ as high level stage and
has the value ’4G/5G communication disruption’ as
↪→ potential adversary action and
has the value ’POI uses social media alias
↪→ extensively’ as potential adversary action
↪→ and
has the value ’Limited data storage in theatre’ as
↪→ constraint and
has the value ’Data Audit trail required for legal
↪→ reasons’ as constraint.
there is a mission instance named ’mi_1’ that
is an instance of the mission ’person of interest
↪→ tracking’ and
is executed by the coalition ’US/UK/KISH’ and
is executed in the mission environment ’urban’ and
is executed in the environmental condition
↪→ instance ’eci_1’ and
has the value ’2019-02-21 13:20’ as start time.
Fig. 5: CE concept definitions for a mission and mission
instance
Fig. 6: CE Model illustrating concepts and relationships
values are then generated for each condition between the lower
and upper bounds according to a user-configurable granularity
parameter—i.e. if the humidity level has a lower bound of 0%,
an upper bound of 100% and the granularity parameter is 5,
values 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% would be generated.
This refers to line 2 in Algorithm 1. To ensure coverage of a
wide range of possible conditions, an environmental condition
Algorithm 1 Generalized Fact Generation
1: B ← base concept
2: V ← generateValues(B)
3: C ← generateAllCombinations(V )
4: facts← set()
5: for ci in C do
6: CE ← generateCE(ci)
7: facts← facts ∪ CE
8: end for
9: return facts
instance is generated for each possible combination of the
environmental conditions—i.e. setting the granularity param-
eter to 5 and using the 6 different environmental conditions
there would be 56 = 15, 625 different environmental condition
instances which corresponds to line 3 in Algorithm 1. Also,
during the combination process, we normalize each condition
and compute a weighted average to denote the severity of each
environmental condition instance, according to the importance
weight specified for each condition. Then we iterate over all
the possible combinations and build a CE fact sentence, such
as those shown in Figure 5. This corresponds to lines 5–
8 in Algorithm 1. Next, all the possible ALFUS scores are
generated. Recall from Section II-D that an overall ALFUS
score is the sum of the capability scores, which identifies
the level of complexity of a mission an asset can deal with,
the level of environmental complexity an asset can operate
in and the amount of human involvement an asset requires.
Given each capability can be scored between 0–3 inclusive
and that there are 3 capabilities, we generate 43 = 64
overall ALFUS scores, representing all possible combinations
of scores for mission complexity, environment complexity
and human interaction. We manually add an additional score
for ALFUS level 10 as level 10 is independent from other
ALFUS levels. Given all coalitions, mission environments,
mission types, generated environmental condition instances
and a predefined list of 4 start times, we generate all possible
combinations of mission instances which ensures our dataset
covers all possible conditions a mission could be executed
under. Setting the granularity parameter for the environmental
conditions to 5 and assuming there is 1 coalition, 4 mission
environment types (Table I) and 2 mission types, we generate
1 ∗ 4 ∗ 2 ∗ 15625 = 125, 000 possible mission instances. To
account for asset serviceability, we generate a set of assets
of varying type including physical assets, autonomous assets
and virtual assets. For the autonomous assets we utilize the
generated ALFUS scores in order to specify varying levels
of capability and constraints. We also specify an asset worth,
to denote it’s value to a particular owner. For autonomous
assets, the worth is set dynamically based on it’s autonomous
capability. In order to represent the fluid notion of assets
dynamically coming online/offline during a mission and to
enable asset utilization requests to be modeled we define the
concept of a live asset inventory that stores the real-time
status of a collection of assets for every coalition partner
on every mission instance. We then assign a random set of
assets to each coalition partner’s inventory, where the number
of assets to assign is user configurable. Also, we generate
a random starting configuration for each asset including a
latitude/longitude location, a risk of adversarial compromise
and a Boolean value indicating if this asset is available to use.
The bounding box used to generate the initial asset locations
is also user configurable. Finally, we create the concept of an
asset request which indicates that a coalition partner requested
to use an asset from another coalition partner on a given
mission instance at a particular time. The request is also
annotated through user configurable logic to determine an
approve or reject decision which outlines whether this request
is successful or not.
C. Customized Data Generation
In order to generate customized data that supports a desired
level of complexity, scripts within the online repository2 can
be used. These scripts accept user-defined logic to decide the
final asset request annotations. Using the JavaScript Object
Notation (JSON) format, logic can be specified as shown in
Figure 8 to decide whether to approve a request from one
coalition partner to use an asset from another coalition partner.
For example, Figure 8 states that if the coalition partner who
owns the asset trusts the coalition partner requesting the asset
by a trust value ≥ 0.3 and the asset is currently available to
use, the risk of adversarial compromise of this asset is less than
40%, the mission environment is either urban or mountainous
and the wind speed is less than 30mph then approve this asset
request, otherwise the asset request should be rejected. CE
facts will then be inserted into the knowledge base to define
each annotated request. A sample of generated asset requests
is shown in Figure 7.
This enables researchers to specify custom, potentially
complex logic to define a policy model that can be used to
evaluate future GPM architectures.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a conceptual domain model and
dataset for use on the DAIS-ITA research programme. The
domain model has been built using an agile representation
framework which enables future work to extend our model
easily using controlled natural language. Also, the dataset
complexity can be controlled using custom logic declarations
that will support future evaluations for GPMs. Future work
involves the ability to support partial data generation to
simulate a real-world scenario where a complete dataset is
not available and to investigate the suitability of Generative
Adversarial Neural Networks for the suitability of synthetic
data generation in the coalition environment.
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